The Eastern Construction of the Artificial Mind by Vallverdú, Jordi,
Enrahonar. Quaderns de Filosofia 47, 2011 171-185
The Eastern Construction of the Artificial Mind1
Jordi Vallverdú
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
Departament de Filosofia 
jordi.vallverdu@uab.cat 
Abstract
In this paper we will analyse the possible similarities and differences between scientists 
dealing with AI and robotics from the West and those from the East. Another question that 
arises is: is there such a thing as an AI & robotics paradigm specific to Eastern research? 
Through the analysis of cultural, philosophical and technical aspects, this research will 
show that there is no real Eastern model of the artificial mind, although their background 
ideas have influenced world-wide research in the field deeply.
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Resumen. La construcción de la mente artificial desde Oriente
En este artículo vamos a analizar las posibles semejanzas y diferencias entre los científicos 
que se ocupan de la IA y la robótica en Oriente y Occidente. La primera pregunta que 
surge es: ¿existe realmente un paradigma propio oriental para la IA y la robótica? A través 
del análisis de los aspectos culturales, filosóficos y técnicos, esta investigación mostrará que 
no hay un verdadero modelo oriental de mente artificial, aunque sus ideas filosóficas han 
influido profundamente a nivel mundial en esa investigación.
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1. Introduction
Minor White, an American photographer (1908-1976), changed his photo-
graphic style when he became a follower of Zen Buddhism. Can our beliefs 
about the world change the viewpoint from which we perceive and reproduce 
it? Throughout history, Western philosophers and scientists have neglected 
the achievements of their Eastern counterparts. There was a gap between the 
two worlds of thought. The reasons for this gap were not only methodological 
but also the result of opposing religious, economic and political strategies. 
Moreover, a difficulty for Western intellectuals was one of access to the pri-
mary sources, because of their geographical remoteness and unfamiliar lan-
guages (Sanskrit, Chinese, Japanese...), and this made a meeting of minds a 
significantly complex task. Neither the mental attitudes involved, nor the 
physical constraints were ideal for the symbiosis of concepts and ideas. Nev-
ertheless, there are authors who have devoted themselves to bridging the gap2.
This stated, we can start our analysis of the common points and differ-
ences between Eastern and Western AI researchers by trying to elucidate the 
nature of AI research goals and attitudes towards them. 
2. Things or Minds? The Revolution within Cognitive Sciences
First of all, we should undertake a short revision of some theories of mind, 
both from Eastern and Western perspectives. After this, we will have sufficient 
material to analyse current conceptions of artificial minds.
2.1. The Geography of Philosophy
Philosophy has been developed independently (but with plenty of historical 
feedback) by Eastern and Western specialists. Despite the hundreds of authors 
and detailed thought involved, it could be considered that, in the West, phil-
osophical analysis of the mind has represented a continuum from Greek phi-
losophy up to the present day. It is a dualist (body-soul/mind) approach that 
reached its highest peak with Descartes, but was revised with behaviourism 
and finally led to contemporary cognitive psychology, with the profound 
influence of the computational paradigm3. By contrast, in Eastern countries, 
and especially in Japan, there was no influential mind-body dualism. Instead, 
it has long been thought that the mind and the body are inseparable (Ishii, 
2005). Nevertheless, if we consider that Buddhism views the body as an inde-
pendent system from the real self, and that the body is impermanent, decaying 
and out of control, perhaps Buddhism is not so far from some kinds of West-
ern dualism. And there are also dualists in Hindu philosophy, such as the 
2. Needham (1954), is the best example. Tola & Dragonetti have written several books on 
the philosophical characteristics of Eastern thought.
3. We should include the crucial research results of some contemporary neurologists such as 
Rofolfo Llinás or Antonio Damasio.
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Dvaita school. This is, in a nutshell, the basic geographical perspective regard-
ing the functioning of the mind.
2.2. Cognitive Sciences
The Cognitive Sciences, as a field of research, have appeared relatively recent-
ly (1979, U.S. Cognitive Science Society; 1983 Japanese Cognitive Science 
Society,...). It is a multidisciplinary research field, embracing AI, psychology, 
neuroscience, philosophy and linguistics. Computer science has a deep influ-
ence at the metaphoric level (‘brain as a computer’, Von Neumann 1958) as 
well as at a practical level (computer simulations of mind, neural nets). 
Although the keystone of research within the cognitive sciences is an interest 
in the mind as a whole, the investigation of verbal/non-verbal thinking and 
metacognition (the ability to think about thought itself) are also interesting 
aspects of this field.
In an effort to be concise and clear, we can affirm that today there are three 
main theoretical approaches in cognitive science (according to Petitot et al. 2000):
Computational-symbolic: this approach analyses the mind in terms of compu-
tations and the (sequential) processing of information in the form of sym-
bols according to identifiable (axiomated-deductive logical) rules.
Connectionist-dynamic: by contrast, the connectionist approach analyses the 
mind as a network which produces behavioural dynamics that are regular 
and definable. This is also a representation manipulation approach. Thus, 
connectionism models mental or behavioural phenomena as the emergent 
processes of interconnected networks of simple units. There are many forms 
of connectionism, but the most common forms use neural network models, 
and these are able to run parallel distributed processes.
Embodied-enactive: this approach understands cognition as emerging from the 
activity of embodied agents.
2.3. Cognition into AI
We can consider that behaviourism, the previous paradigm, is now obsolete 
and that the current co-existent approaches are the three mentioned above. In 
an attempt to relate mind studies with AI research I must now identify points 
of contact between them. As I have explained in detail elsewhere (Vallverdú, 
2006), AI is a multidisciplinary activity that involves specialists from several 
fields such as neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, logic, robotics, computer 
sciences, mathematics, social sciences, biology, philosophy and software engi-
neering. And it covers a number of areas of interest, such as intelligence, the 
representation of knowledge, creativity, robotics, language translation, domot-
ics, emotions, data mining, intentionality, consciousness and learning. There 
are basically two main approaches to doing research on AI, which we can 
summarise as top down and bottom up approaches:
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i.  Top Down: symbol system hypothesis (Douglas Lenat, Herbert Simon). 
The top down approach constitutes the classical model. It works with sym-
bol systems, which represent entities in the world. A reasoning engine 
operates in a domain independent way on the symbols. SHRDLU (Wino-
grad), Cyc (Douglas Lenat) or expert systems are examples of it.
ii.  Bottom Up: physical grounding hypothesis (situated activity, situated 
embodiment). This approach (led by Rodney Brooks), is based on the 
physical grounding hypothesis. Here, the system is connected to the world 
via a set of sensors and the engine extracts all its knowledge from these 
physical sensors. Brooks talks about «intelligence without representation»: 
complex intelligent systems will emerge as a result of complex interactive 
and independent machines.
Summarised in the following table, we can see that there are basic parallels 
between cognitive sciences, philosophical approaches and AI approaches:
Table 1. Cognitive Sciences and AI contacts
Philosophy
Paradigms Western Eastern Cognitive Sciences AI
Wiener Kreis Mohism
Computational-
symbolic Top Down
Philosophy
of mind Buddhism
Connectionist-
dynamic Top Down
Phenomenology Buddishm Embodied enactive Bottom-Up
In any case, over recent years several authors interested in the relationships 
between theories of mind and Buddhist ideas have appeared (Watson, Batch-
elor & Claxton, 2000). One of the reasons is that Buddhism, like connection-
ism and related methods of cognition, does not see any central Self controlling 
the actions of the body, only the interaction of khandas or aggregates. The 
difference between connectionism and Buddhism is that the former sees mind 
as merely a bodily function, while the later has a wider idea of the mind (as a 
force).
Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991) have based their radical view of the 
situated and fragmented self on their own mixture of connectionism, herme-
neutics and Buddhism. The key idea is their theory of enaction. With this 
theory they try to solve several problems:
— The phenomenologist disembodied theories of mind.
— The cognitivist idea of an information-processing model of the mind.
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With the idea of enaction, based on the hermeneutical praxis of ‘bringing 
forth of meaning’, they integrate the body-soul dualist Cartesianism, establish-
ing an interdependence between the observer (man) and the observed (world). 
To be able to enact the world, we must be embodied in it. For this reason, the 
authors believe they have solved the (classic Western) conflict between experi-
ence and cognition. Unfortunately, they also affirm that the idea of meditation 
and groundlessness led Eastern philosophers to a spontaneous compassion, 
and not to the nihilist Western approaches. Following Aristotle (Physics, 
191a28-29), we can state that «What is cannot come to be (since it already 
is), while nothing can come to be from what is not»; from this perspective, 
nothing can/must arise from groundlessness, neither nihilism, nor compassion. 
Groundlessness can only lead us to groundlessness. Emptiness cannot fill up 
the world with sense, any kind of sense. Nevertheless, Buddhism is a very 
attractive philosophy/religion because of its richer approach to the mind. Ein-
stein argued that Buddhism was a superior and more scientific belief (Dukas 
& Hoffman, 1954)4. This positive attitude towards Eastern thinking can be 
found at the beginning of the 19th Century: transcendentalists such as Thoreau 
and Whitman wrote books including Eastern ideas. And William James, a 
seminal psychologist, was completely astonished and delighted when he heard 
the ideas of the Dharmapala. James even used terms such as ‘stream of con-
sciousness’, a literal English translation of the Sanskrit vinnana-sota (a Bud-
dhist metaphor for the impermanent nature of the mind) (James, 1902).
Returning to the idea of ‘enaction’, we can also observe that it is related to 
the autopoietic ideas of Humberto Maturana and we must also acknowledge 
that it draws on some of the phenomenological ideas of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (Phenomenology of Perception, 1945). Following on from Tola & Drag-
onetti (2009), who maintain that there is an essential identity between Indian 
and Western philosophies up until the sixteenth century, I strongly believe 
that Eastern and Western thoughts have more points in common than differ-
ences, if we are able to work with the extended corpus of both philosophical 
traditions. Perhaps there is a different philosophical mainstream in the two 
areas, but if we look into the detail and perhaps analyse the more extreme and 
radical authors (who tend to be freer) the differences are not so great. As in a 
game of chess, grammatical and semantic uses will often lead us to dead-ends. 
In this sense, there is no Eastern thought and Western thought, but merely 
Universal human thought.
After the initial psychological interest of James in Buddhism, there was no 
further major approach until the end on 20th Century. New non-invasive 
techniques on in vivo brain analysis (fMRI, EEG, MEG, NIR, PET, 
4. The dilemma regarding the distance between subject and object has been shown to be 
insoluble from the quantum physics approach (particles with known position or velocity 
but never with both) as well as by way of philosophical ideas on the infradetermination of 
theories. There is no space for the debate about the isomorphism between the world and 
our ideas, because it is not real, being simply an operational fiction useful for the purposes 
of our survival.
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SPECT...), with better sensitivity and resolution, allowed a renewed interest in 
Eastern meditation practices (as well as in studies of the mind). Some experts 
have claimed that it constitutes a new research field: neurotheology. This, also 
known as spiritual neuroscience, is the study of correlations of neural phenom-
ena with subjective experiences of spirituality, and hypotheses to explain these 
phenomena (Biello, 2007; Hayward & Varela 2001). The Naropa Institute 
(Boulder, Colorado) is entirely devoted to this type of study. Founded by Chö-
gyam Trungpa Rinpoche in 1974, the Naropa Institute (later to become Naropa 
University) realised Trungpa’s vision of creating a university that would combine 
contemplative studies with traditional Western scholastic and artistic disciplines. 
This research field covering cognition and spiritual beliefs/behaviours, is also 
called neurophenomenology (Watson, Batchelor & Claxton, 2000).
3. From cognitive sciences to AI
According to Pickering (1997), the interest in reducing mental life to compu-
tational procedures led experts to move from Cognitivism to Connectionism, 
opening the door to the fruitful interaction with Buddhism. Connectionism has 
some common points of view with Buddhism, such as the consideration of 
behaviour as resulting from connection or relationship, instead of the result 
of a biological processor that acts like a CPU.
A different point of view is that of autopoietic programming. Autopoi-
etic computer programming is an AI area in which some of the ideas 
of autopoiesis and enaction are active. According to Wiedermann (2007), 
an autopoietic automaton can algorithmically generate an offspring control-
led by a program which is a modification of its parent’s program. Autopoi-
etic automata offer a neat framework for investigating computational and 
complexity issues in the evolutionary self-reproducing processes. Wiedermann 
thinks that the computational power of lineages of autopoietic automata is 
equal to that of an interactive non-deterministic Turing machine, and that 
there exists an autopoietic automaton giving rise to an unlimited evolution, 
provided that suitable inputs are delivered to individual automata. In 2004, 
the journal Artificial Life dedicated a special number to «Thirty years of com-
putational autopoiesis: a review», 10(3): 277-295.
Finally, we can also consider AI from a Buddhist perspective. Promta & 
Himma have very recently (2008) written a paper that is the first to clarify the 
Buddhist position on AI, and perhaps represents the first attempt to explore 
the relationships between any major religion and the AI agenda.
4. Eastern Attitudes towards Robots: friends or boddhis?
4.1. Historical precedents
At least in Japan, of all the Eastern countries, there is a tradition with autom-
ata: karakuri ningyo. Tea-carrying machines, dating from the 17th Century, are 
recognised as the first Japanese ‘robots’. With the Western introduction of 
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clockwork technologies, karakuri became increasingly complex. Beyond the 
historical divergence of Eastern and Western marionette traditions (such as 
their means of operation: from above and in the darkness in the West but from 
beneath in the East), karakuri tried, from the beginning, to express several 
emotions. The interest in reproducing anthropomorphic movements is not the 
ultimate goal of these puppets, and karakuri are something akin to temples, 
being considered as kami. Let me introduce this concept in the next section.
4.2. Spiritual and philosophical trends
One of the most famous eastern roboticists who has written on the relationships 
between robotics and religion is Masahiro Mori. After writing a classic paper 
on the topic of human emotional responses to robots (1970, «Bukimi No 
Tani», translated as «The Uncanny Valley»), in 1974 he published The Buddha 
in the Robot: a Robot Engineer’s Thoughts on Science and Religion, in which he 
discussed the Buddhist approach to robotics. In the first lines of this book he 
wrote: «I believe robots have the Buddha-nature within them —that is, the 
potential for attaining Buddhahood». How is this possible? The argument of 
Prof. Mori was: all things in the universe are related one to another, in a way 
that the whole can be seen in any part. Taking this further, belief in the discrete 
existence of beings and things, that is, between beings and their bodies, is 
totally flawed. The illusion of a discrete world populated by entities is simply 
that— an illusion. The basic life-force, called ku¯, forms and moves everything. 
In animist Japanese tradition this force is present in inanimate objects and is 
called kami. Kami is the fundamental unit of the sacred in Shinto. This life 
is in animals, people and rocks, trees, rivers and mountains too. Consequently, 
matter has the nature of Buddha. For this reason, he argued that the Buddha-
nature must also be present in the machines and the robots that roboticists 
make. The truth of the universe is embodied in all its parts.
For this reason, the Dalai Lama expressed in Hayward & Varela (2001) 
the idea that a stream of consciousness could enter into a computer, and that 
a scientist, highly involved throughout his life in computer research, could be 
reborn in a computer. The idea being: possible reincarnation in a half-human/
half-machine form, and a positive view regarding genuine life and mind in 
robots. For Mori, there exists an interdependency between humans and 
machines, a reciprocity in the relationship between humans and machines. 
They do not need to make the comparisons that some Western scientists do 
(from Julien Offray de La Mettrie, and his Homme Machine to Von 
Neumann’s equiparation of brains with computers). Although we should not 
consider ourselves to be like the ‘lifeless’ machines of the typical Western 
conception of a machine, according to Mori this conception is flawed, since 
machines, like all entities, do in fact share with us the Buddha-nature. Japa-
nese roboticists don’t need to make a previous robotization of the human body 
to feel closer to their machines: they just feel that both, humans and robots, 
are sharing the same Buddha-nature (or Kami, for shintoists).
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In 1970 Mori founded the Jizai Kenkyujo (Mukta Research Institute), a 
research group on Buddhism and robotics. They promote the fusing of Japa-
nese thinking and technology with creative thinking (Pope & Metzler, 2008). 
Mori also found points of contact between the concept of cybernetics (cre-
ated by Norbert Wiener in 1948, Cybernetics: or the Control and Communica-
tion in the Animal and the Machine, and Cambridge: The MIT Press) and the 
Buddhist idea of (self) control. Besides, machines are something created by 
man, they are the reflection of his will and extensions of his body. We cannot 
say that they are good or bad in essence, because existence is neutral. There-
fore, machines have wide potentialities. With a healthy sense of humour there 
have even appeared some ‘AI Koans’, such as this one5: 
A student, in hopes of understanding the Lambda-nature, came to Green-
blatt. As they spoke a Multics system hacker walked by. «Is it true», asked the 
student, «that PL-1 has many of the same data types as Lisp?» Almost before 
the student had finished his question, Greenblatt shouted, «FOO!», and hit 
the student with a stick.
Certainly, this is not a true koan, but a fake one, although it shows us the 
interest AI researchers have in Eastern ideas about the mind and their com-
putational consequences.
4.3. Animism, Shintoism and machines
According to the Inglehart-Welzel Cultural Map of the World (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005) Japan is the most secular-rational country in the world. Despite 
this fact, Japanese society also has a great respect for traditional values and 
classic social structure. Although their citizens are not strong believers, most 
of the Japanese population is either Buddhist or Shintoist. These religions are 
the cultural background of their society, in the same way that Christian ideas 
are tacitly embedded in European societies, despite post-modern, atheistic or 
nihilist perspectives developed within them. This is important because, thanks 
to the main religious beliefs, we can easily recognise the underlying social 
attitudes towards robots and AI in Japan, and the roots of such attitudes. With 
a certain cultural eclecticism, it is sometimes said that the Japanese are born 
Shinto, marry Christian and are buried Buddhist.
For Shintoism, objects and natural events have their own spirits or gods. 
These ideas come from the early ancestors of Japanese citizens and are called 
‘animism’. For this reason, things, natural or artificial have the same onto-
logical status as living entities. It is in this context that we can understand that 
the company Tmusk went to pray at Munataka Taisha Shrine for the safety 
and industrial success of their new robot Kiyomori. Shinto allows for the 
consideration of the sanctity of robots, as well as that of humans or other 
animals. At the beginning of the introduction of robots into industrial plants, 
5. http://www.serve.com/cmtan/buddhism/Lighter/aikoans.html
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workers named the robots. This is an obsolete practice nowadays because there 
are now too many to name (Geraci, 2006). There even exists a robot priest at 
the Central Cemetery at Yokohama; shaped like a human, the machines is 
lowered into the prayer hall every morning to chant Buddhist prayers on 
behalf of human beings. 
There is also a robot monk at Oroku-ji, a temple in Kakogawa city. Fixed 
in a kneeling position, it features a smoothly shaven head and prominent ears, 
just like its human counterparts. Clad in priestly robes, it grasps a string 
of juzu (Buddhist prayer beads) in its left hand. This particular robot is the 
creation of Yoshihiro Motooka, a 65-year-old former railway technician. Most 
interesting is that the creator, in line with Buddhist precepts against wasteful 
excess, made the robot with discarded items, including parts from a bicycle, 
a cassette tape recorder, and a washing machine motor. Tools or do¯gu are 
sanctified and it is generally accepted that recycling with due respect for the 
sanctity of objects is an important idea for the Japanese. There is also a robo-
priest for funeral services, programmed to deliver word-perfect prayers accord-
ing to the rites of seven different Buddhist sects, as well as Shinto and two 
Christian faiths. Robo-Priest is the centrepiece of a chapel built to the design 
of Mr Hideo Yoshino, 59, the head of a Yokohama construction company 
that decided last year to get into Japan’s lucrative and highly competitive 
funeral industry. Robo-Priest was built to promote this automated necropolis. 
The date of a client’s death is programmed into the computer, and every year 
the priest will descend hydraulically from his refuge in the roof and say sutras 
for the soul of the departed for half an hour. This is an automated version of 
the Western Perpetual Mass. Thus, technological objects have their own sacred 
life. Just as Shinto priests can officiate at the sanctification of industrial robots, 
Buddhist monks lead consecrations at the demise of everyday objects like 
discarded dolls or printing blocks. 
The Japanese don’t fear robots: their most recent incorporation into their 
society is SAYA. Saya is the result of 15 years of research and is being tested 
as a teacher after working as a receptionist, she —or it— is multilingual, can 
organize set tasks for pupils (elementary-school students in Tokyo), call the 
roll and get angry when the children misbehave. Saya is just one example of 
Japan’s determination to put a robot in every home by 2015. They feel their 
robots are so human that they even created the Akazawa Robot Clinic (Osaka), 
explicitly avoiding the idea of a ‘repair shop’. The ‘head doctor’, Kazuhiro 
Oono says that Japanese people don’t want their robots repaired, they want 
them treated. Then there is Geminoid the twin robot of Prof. Hiroshi Ishiguro, 
uncannily realistic and the attempt of his creator to create a second identity 
for himself. Meanwhile the chatbot Buddhabots (www.buddhabots.com), an 
entertaining spiritual teacher for those who have time to chat, would scarcely 
be accepted in any Western version (such as ‘Jesusbot.com’6) promoting auto-
6. Nevertheless, there does exist JesusBot.org. The JesusBot script is that of a general irc bot 
with the following features: multiple networks w/individual settings, preferred server & 
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matic on-line religion or metaphysics. However the Japanese accept robots for 
another (political) reason: their cultural reluctance to accept immigrant work-
ers, a big problem (a threat, to be precise) when you consider the low birth 
rates in Japan.
4.4. Pop culture
The ideas of Mori about the Buddha-nature of robots had a great impact on 
both eastern and western societies. In the East, citizens have grown to love 
robots with the development of fiction about robots, from manga comics to 
TV cartoon series and films. The influence of manga is so great on Japanese 
children, that they even draw differently from children in other cultures (Wil-
son, 2002). Thus manga not only affects how children receive information 
about the word but also transforms the way in which they see and perceive 
the world.
In 1951 Osamu Tezuka created a comic figure called «Tetsuwan Atomu», 
known outside Japan as Astro Boy or Mighty Atom. His story was set in 2003, 
and Tetsuwan was a robot who resembled a young boy on the outside, but pos-
sessed superhuman powers, thanks to his advanced technology. After a success-
ful manga comic reception, his audience increased even more at a national level 
when in 1963 Astro Boy was broadcast on Japanese television. Astro Boy, so his 
story goes, was created by a top scientist at the National Space agency to replace 
a son who died tragically. Nuclear-powered and with enormous strength, he was 
placed in a normal family environment (although with robot parents) and went 
to school with normal children. Through manga and anime, Astro Boy became 
a social reference for a generation of Japanese children (Krebs, 2006). This 
young robot created the robot-friendly attitude in Japan, by generating a positive 
image of robots. Even at an architectural level, there is a techno-orientalist 
approach that offers interesting robot shapes: the Bank of Asia in Bangkok uses 
mechanistic imagery, a round shaped toy robot.
This friendly attitude can be seen in Japanese workers: they raised few objec-
tions to the introduction of industrial robots into the workplace. This is a very 
different attitude from that of certain European ‘Luddites’. Tetsuwan Atomu 
had ten ethical rules (rather than the three of in Asimov’s literature) related to 
respect for human beings. After this new popular hero more robots arrived in 
anime: Doraemon, Mazinger Z, Arare (Dr. Slump), Ironman, Amuro Ray pilot-
ing Gundam, EVA Unit 01 (from Neon Genesis Evangelion or Shin Seiki Ibang-
erion)... and these days we in the West also have an Eastern offering in the form 
of the Transformers, warrior robots introduced (and re-branded) in the U.S. by 
the Japanese toy company Takara, under the license of Hasbro. 
Doraemon, for example, has the appearance of the stereotypical kawaii 
formula (the Japanese notion of ‘cuteness’): small, soft, mammalian and 
nick lists, chess with 25 good colour schemes & knows the rules, database of quotes with 
impressive adding/retrieval capabilities, and more.
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extremely round. Like Astro Boy, Doraemon lives in a normal family environ-
ment with his friend Nobita and helps him with his various problems (Schodt, 
1988). Intermediaries between science and imagination, these robots represent 
robots as close, benign and friendly beings. Acceptability also derives from 
religious and cultural contexts. For example, there is the idea of Mottainai, 
which can be translated in different ways but which expresses care for things 
based on the belief in the ‘soul’ or vital force inside things, even artificial enti-
ties such as robots. Semantically, Mottainai is a compound word: mottai+nai. 
Mottai (勿体) refers to the intrinsic dignity or sacredness of a material entity, 
while Nai (無い) indicates an absence or lack. For this reason, things cannot 
be treated as less worthy or more worthy. Artificial organs, for example are 
considered culturally by Japanese people to be good, reliable, trustworthy 
machines. They do not display the classic fear of the machine or of the creative 
capacity of human beings that we find in Western societies (Golem, Frank-
enstein, Hal-9000, Matrix....). Wilson’s book (1991) is an example of this 
western fear. Even for sexual purposes (Sexdolls, Sexaroid...), there is a great-
er enthusiasm. The robot anthropologist Kathleen Richardson made an inter-
esting contribution to this debate with her Ph.D. thesis Annihilating Differ-
ence? Robots and Building Design at MIT. As shown in the Aichi 2005 
exhibition, the Japanese have robots for every aspect of life: child care (NEC’s 
Papero), communication (Wakamaru) and therapy (AIST’s Paro) robots, 
androids (Kokoro Actroid), cleaning (Matushita Electric, Fuji Heavy Indus-
tries) and security (Tmsuk) robots, as well as entertainment robots (AIST’s 
dinosaurs, Toyota’s humanoids). 
Obviously, Eastern researchers see that Western society does not feel so 
close to robotics, at least to humanoid research. It is in this context that we 
can understand that in 1996, Katutoshi Tagami, then chief of Honda’s Wako 
Research Center, travelled to the Vatican to consult the opinion of Christian 
rulers about humanoid robots, his main research (Geraci, 2006). The Vatican 
did not overtly criticise Honda’s efforts, but this doesn’t mean that Western-
ers (most of them culturally Christian) don’t maintain a generally negative 
attitude towards humanoid robotics.
The only barrier to this closeness seems to be the so-called Uncanny Valley. 
The uncanny valley hypothesis holds that when robots and other facsimiles of 
humans look and act almost like actual humans, it causes a response of revul-
sion among human observers. The «valley» in question is a dip in a proposed 
graph of the positivity of human reaction as a function of a robot’s lifelikeness. 
It was introduced in 1970 by Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori (who we 
mentioned earlier), and has been linked to Ernst Jentsch’s concept of «the 
uncanny» identified in a 1906 essay, «On the Psychology of the Uncan-
ny». Jentsch’s conception is famously elaborated upon by Sigmund Freud in 
a 1919 essay entitled «The Uncanny» («Das Unheimliche»). 
We must also take into account the fact that Eastern societies have greater 
IT and robotics implementation and social integration than Western ones. 
For example, in 2007 Korea created the ‘Robot Ethics Charter’ (REC), the 
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first legal regulatory system for robots in the world. The reason of the REC 
is twofold: first, to prepare for the future establishment of ethical guidelines 
for the partnership between people and robots; second, to establish Korea 
as a test bed country for robots. But there is another reason, a deeper one: 
they love robots (they do not look upon them as competitors), and they wish 
to have robots in every stage and position in their lives. The social and con-
sumer demand for robots is extremely high and thus they are preparing their 
laws for this situation.
The reasons of this social demands are multiple: headed towards an age-
ing society with low birth rates, Korea is facing the future prospect of dif-
ficulty in caring for the elderly with a reduced working population; mean-
while family robots (for fun or home activities such as cooking, cleaning...) 
are already in the market; they have a positive attitude towards robots, due 
to cultural-religious ideas and the mass-media bombardment of robot stories 
(comics, cinema, literature, television,...). In Europe debate has also begun 
around these topics, as shown by the EURON Roboethics Roadmap. In 
January 2004, the Scuola di Robotica (Genoa, Italy) organised the First 
International Symposium on Roboethics (www.roboethics.org).
The success and the important follow-ups of that event encouraged the pro-
ponents to design a more continuous and systematic approach: the Roboethics 
Atelier inside EURON. In June 2006 the Euron Roboethics Atelier Project 
came to a close. The result of the project was a Roboethics Roadmap, pro-
duced and reviewed by the Atelier participants. And responding to the 
Japanese government demand for robotics research (the Japanese Govern-
ment declared the robotics industry to be one of the seven most critical 
industrial fields in its Strategy for Creating New Industry in May 2004), 
Fukuoka Prefecture has applied for and received the first nation-wide des-
ignation as a Special Zone for Development and Practical Experiment with 
Robotics, and promotes the research and development of next-generation 
robots that co-operate and coexist with humans. The development by Sony 
of a useless robot, like QRIO, is an example of this social interest in robotics. 
Perhaps it is unfair to call it ‘useless’, perhaps it should be called an ‘enter-
tainment robot’.
Conclusions
Despite the cultural differences between Eastern and Western researchers on 
AI and robotics, from a theoretical point of view most of them are functional-
ists7. Even in Japan, leading robotics professors (e.g. Hiroshi Ishiguro, Minoru 
Asada,...) are functionalists, considering some ideas of Buddhism expressed 
by Mori in relation to robots as mere superstition (MacDorman, Vasudevan 
& Ho, 2008). For this reason I cannot agree with Geraci (2006) when he says 
7. Personal communication of Prof.Karl F. MacDorman. I recommend his excellent writings 
on human-computer relationships.
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that AI research paradigms in Japan and the U.S. are different. Slight differ-
ences (such as more interest in humanoid robots in Japan as opposed to dis-
embodied AI and task-specific robots in the U.S. and Europe) cannot support 
the argument that the two approaches, Eastern and Western, are different in 
essence.
Another different question is how the lay populations of their respective 
countries see and support both research fields. Public perception of science is 
not only a question of interest for sociologists but also the key to understand-
ing the public and private investment in these areas of knowledge. Thus we 
could consider that some elements of Buddhism could be interpreted in cer-
tain ways that are compatible with functionalism (that is, the belief that eve-
rything arises owing to causes and conditions).
From the material analysed we can conclude that:
Buddhism has an important influence on sciences of the mind from the 
second half of the 20th Century until today. This implies an influence on the 
approach to the creation and simulation of artificial minds (AI).
There is no unified Eastern approach to robotics or AI, although there 
are different views, goals and ideas within these fields, which have contrib-
uted to Eastern countries being at a more advanced stage of AI & robotics 
research.
The Eastern population is robot-friendly, for religious and social (manga, 
tv, anime) reasons. The Western population takes a contrary view (at least for 
humanoid robots). Nevertheless, first cross-cultural studies show us that there 
are more striking similarities in attitudes towards robots than differences 
between Eastern and Western populations (MacDorman, Vasudevan & Ho, 
2008). The way in which robots or humans are presented (as weapons, per-
sonal care, human substitution, real things or anime fantasies,...) is the key to 
the analysis of people’s real attitudes.
Western and Eastern AI research are not intrinsically different.
Leading research and implementation on robotics is mainly run in Japan, 
the so-called robot kingdom, or «robotto okoku».
This friendly attitude is beginning to increase in Western countries as is 
demonstrated by the new research into artificial emotions (affective comput-
ing, social robots, synthetic emotions). The new journal, released by the 
author as Editor-in-Chief at the end of 2009, the International Journal of 
Synthetic Emotions is the first step in this direction8.
What is viewed with optimism and a friendly attitude in Eastern countries, 
that is, the creation of more powerful robots, or even cyborgs, is called in 
Western ones ‘apocalyptic AI’ (Geraci, 2008). Robots are only robots, and it 
is us who decide on the wishes or fears we have of them, at least at this point 
in robotics research.
8. http://www.igi-global.com/journals/details.asp?ID=33374.
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